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BRIEF OF APPELLEE ANN ANASTASION 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Article VIII Sections 1 and 3 of the 
Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-
3(2) (j) (Supp. 1993); and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (1993). 
Court of Appeals# 940535-CA 
District Court # 910906462 
Priority # 15 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE ONE: 
Whether the trial court was correct in ruling that 
because the Offer of Judgment was made to Plaintiff Merle Lee 
Allred (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), and was not made to Pacificorp 
Electric Operations and Aetna Health Plans (hereinafter "Aetna"), 
that Aetna did not have any right or authority to accept the 
Offer of Judgment Ann Anastasion made to Plaintiff. 
ISSUE TWO: 
Whether the trial court was correct in ruling that, 
based on all the facts and circumstances presented by this case, 
the Judgment entered against Ann Anastasion should be set aside. 
ISSUE THREE: 
Whether the trial court was correct in awarding Ann 
Anastasion the costs she .necessarily and reasonably incurred in 
successfully disputing Aetna's claims for damages. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE ONE: 
The Court's determination that Aetna had no right or 
authority to accept the Offer of Judgment Ann Anastasion made to 
Plaintiff is a conclusion of law and should be reviewed for 
correctness and accorded no particular deference. State in 
Interest of J.J.T.. 877 P.2d 161 (Utah App. 1994). The trial 
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court's conclusion of law, however, is based upon factual 
findings which have not been challenged on appeal. Since Aetna 
has failed to marshal the evidence or challenge the trial court's 
factual determinations the Appellate Court should assume that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and review of the 
accuracy of the trial court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law to the facts found by the trial court. 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994). A clearly 
erroneous standard is used to review a trial court's findings of 
fact. They will not be overturned unless they are "against the 
clear weight of the evidence or the appellate court reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
State v. Murphy, 872 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah App. 1994) citations 
omitted. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE TWO; 
Trial courts are "vested with considerable discretion 
under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying [motions] to set aside [] 
judgment [s] ." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1987). A 
trial court's decision to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) 
can only be reversed if an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. 
Id. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE THREE; 
A trial court's determination regarding the award of 
costs is also reviewed "under an abuse of discretion standard" 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah App. 1992) and should only 
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be disturbed if "it is so unreasonable as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Ames v. Mass, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah App. 
1993) quoting Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Wav. 753 P.2d 507, 
512 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
Rules 5, 54, 60(b), and 68(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are determinative of the issues on appeal and 
pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
are included respectively as: Addendum "A"; Addendum "B"; 
Addendum "C"; and Addendum "D" to Defendant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was commenced as a negligence action against 
Ann Anastasion for personal injuries suffered by Plaintiff when 
she cut her ankle on a sheet of metal located in Ann Anastasion's 
garage. After commencement of this action Plaintiff amended her 
Complaint to include Sean Anastasion and Aetna as parties. 
Plaintiff's claims against Sean Anastasion were also based in 
negligence. Because Aetna had paid a portion of Plaintiff's 
medical bills resulting from her injury, Plaintiff named Aetna as 
a Defendant so its subrogation rights arising from the incident 
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at the heart of this lawsuit could be ascertained. Following 
Aetna's injection into this lawsuit, it filed Crossclaims against 
Ann Anastasion and Sean Anastasion and a Counterclaim against 
Plaintiff for any monies recovered as a result of the lawsuit. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was filed on 
October 13, 1991, and served on Ann Anastasion on October 24, 
1991. [R. pp. 6-11]1. Aetna was made a party to this lawsuit 
when it was served with Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint on 
June 2, 1992. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, among other 
things, alleged that: 
Defendant [Aetna] is the health insurance carrier for 
the plaintiff, and has a subrogation interest in any 
funds received by plaintiff herein, either by way of 
verdict, judgment or settlement in this action. 
Further, plaintiff's prosecution of this action and/or 
settlement of this action may tend to have the effect 
of settling or compromising the subrogation rights of 
[Aetna], and, therefore, [Aetna], by reason of its 
subrogation interest, is a correct and proper party to 
this action. 
Aetna [] is the administrator of [Plaintiff's] health 
insurance plan.... 
[R. pp.57-60]. Aetna answered Plaintiff's Third Amended 
Complaint and admitted it had a subrogation right in any funds 
received by plaintiff as a result of this lawsuit. [R. p.73]. 
1
 Unless otherwise stated all references are to the Record as 
paginated by the Clerk of the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
5 
Aetna's Answer included a Counterclaim against 
Plaintiff which asserted both contractual and common law rights 
to be subrogated to Plaintiff's claims against Ann Anastasion and 
Sean Anastasion. [R. p.74]. Aetna's Answer also included 
Crossclaims against Ann Anastasion and Sean Anastasion. Aetna's 
Crossclaim contended that "[b]y virtue of its payment [of 
plaintiff's medical bills, it was] entitled, both contractually 
and under common law principles to be subrogated to the claims of 
plaintiff against defendants Anastasion in this matter." [R. 
p.75]. Ann Anastasion answered Aetna's Crossclaim denying that 
she was negligent or liable to Plaintiff or Aetna for any amount. 
[R. p.78]. 
Throughout the discovery and settlement negotiations of 
this case Ann Anastasion denied any liability for Plaintiff's 
injuries or the medical bills paid by Aetna. On June 30, 1993, 
Ann Anastasion filed a motion and memorandum attempting to have 
Aetna dropped from the lawsuit or in the alternative to have the 
parties realigned to more accurately reflect Aetna's interests as 
a plaintiff. [R. pp.105-10]. Aetna opposed Ann Anastasion's 
motion, arguing that it was subrogated to the claims of its 
insured and was a necessary party to this lawsuit. [R. p.118]. 
On August 2, 1993, Judge Hanson issued a Minute Entry setting 
forth his decision to deny Ann Anastasion's motion to drop Aetna 
from this lawsuit or realign the parties. [R. pp.185-86]. Judge 
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Hanson signed an order denying Ann Anastasion's motion on August 
17, 1993. [R. pp.287-88A]. 
After Ann Anastasion filed her Motion to drop Aetna 
from this lawsuit, but before Judge Hanson ruled on that motion, 
Ann Anastasion submitted an Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff 
offering to allow judgment to be taken against her for Seventeen 
Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars. [R. pp. 139-40 and SSI-
SB] . Plaintiff did not accept Ann Anastasion's Offer of 
Judgment. Aetna, however, did attempt to accept Ann Anastasion's 
offer to Plaintiff. [R. pp. 145-46]. Immediately after learning 
of Aetna's desire to accept the Offer of Judgment which she had 
made to Plaintiff, Ann Anastasion contacted Aetna to clarify its 
mistake. Ann Anastastion informed Aetna that the Offer of 
Judgment: WAS NOT intended for Aetna's acceptance; WAS made to 
Plaintiff; WAS intended to end all litigation associated with 
this claim; WAS served on Aetna pursuant to the service 
requirements of Rule 5 Utah R. Civ. P.; and WAS clearly in excess 
of Aetna's total claim against Ann Anastasion. [R. pp. 188-89, 
210-12, and 361-65]. In spite of that information Aetna informed 
Ann Anastasion that it intended to attempt to enforce its 
purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment. Thereafter, Ann 
Anastasion filed a motion and memorandum to have Aetna's 
purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment stricken. [R. 
pp.199-218]. In total disregard for the disputed nature of 
Aetna's purported acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of 
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Judgment to Plaintiff, Aetna requested and obtained a Judgment 
against Ann Anastasion based upon the disputed acceptance of the 
Offer of Judgment. [R. pp.233-37], Ann Anastasion then moved the 
trial court for an order setting aside the Judgment entered 
against her. [R. pp.259-81]. After reviewing the memoranda 
submitted and hearing oral argument on the issue Judge Hanson 
granted Ann Anastasion's Motion to strike Aetna's purported 
acceptance of the Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff. Consequently, 
Judge Hanson also granted Ann Anastasion's Motion to set aside 
the Judgment entered against her. 
The trial court's decision to strike Aetna's purported 
acceptance of the Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and to set aside 
the Judgment entered against Ann Anastasion was based upon the 
following facts: 
1. Ann Anastasion made an Offer of Judgment to Merle 
Allred. 
2. The Offer of Judgment was never made nor extended to 
Pacificorp or Aetna for their acceptance. 
3. The Offer of Judgment was intended to end all 
litigation associated with Merle Allred's claim for 
personal injuries against Ann Anastasion. 
4. Pacificorp and Aetna attempted to accept the Offer of 
Judgment and obtained a judgment against Ann Anastasion 
pursuant to that purported acceptance. 
5. Pacificorp and Aetna's only interest in this lawsuit is 
a subrogation interest in Merle Allred's claim against 
Ann Anastasion for reimbursement of monies it paid out 
for and on behalf of Merle Allred. 
6. The amount set forth in Ann Anastasion's Offer of 
Judgment to Merle Allred ($17,500.00) was over 
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$2,500.00 greater than the amount Pacificorp and Aetna 
had paid for Merle Allred's medical bills. 
7. Counsel for Ann Anastasion disputed Pacificorp's and 
Aetna's right and capacity to accept the Offer of 
Judgment as soon as they learned Pacificorp and Aetna 
had attempted to accept it. 
8. Pacificorp's and Aetna's claimed subjective belief that 
the Offer of Judgment was made to them was not 
reasonable. 
9. Pacificorp's and Aetna's failure to accept Ann 
Anastasion's Offer of Judgment would not have obliged 
Pacificorp and Aetna to pay Ann Anastasion's costs in 
the event a verdict less favorable that the Offer of 
Judgment was obtained against Ann Anastasion. 
[R. pp.361-365]. A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order are attached hereto as "Addendum E." 
This case was tried to a jury in February of 1994. 
After a trial on the merits, the case was submitted to the jury 
on special verdict interrogatories. The jury answered the 
following interrogatories: 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Defendant, Ann anastasion was negligent? 
YES NO XX 
2. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Defendant, Sean Anastasion was negligent? 
YES NO XX 
The trial court then entered a Judgment on the Jury Verdict which 
dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims and Aetna's Crossclaims 
against Ann Anastasion with prejudice. A copy of the Judgment on 
the Jury Verdict is attached hereto as "Addendum F." 
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The Judgment on the Jury Verdict also awarded Ann 
Anastasion the costs she incurred in successfully defending this 
action. [R. pp.681-83]. Aetna objected to the Judgment on the 
Jury Verdict and to the award of costs to Ann Anastasion. [R. 
pp.684-87]. The initial Judgment on the Jury Verdict did not 
apportion payment of those costs between Aetna and Plaintiff. 
Nevertheless, after receiving and considering memoranda on 
Aetna's objections the trial court clarified its ruling on the 
costs awarded to Ann Anastasion. In a June 8, 1994, Minute Entry 
Judge Hanson ruled that because Aetna's subrogation claim for the 
amount it paid to or on behalf of Plaintiff was not disputed, 
Aetna would not be responsible for any costs incurred by Ann 
Anastasion to dispute Plaintiff's claims for damages. The court 
also ruled that Aetna would be obligated for those costs 
"relating to liability questions...," [R. pp.889-95]. After 
additional objections and some confusion the trial court finally 
signed and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
Order which stated: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff paid the statutory jury demand fee of $50.00. 
2. Subsequently and unnecessarily, Defendant Ann 
Anastasion also paid the statutory jury demand fee of 
$50.00. 
3. Aetna's only involvement in this litigation dealt with 
its subrogation rights as Plaintiff's health insurance 
carrier and, throughout this litigation and for all 
purposes, stood in the shoes of Plaintiff. 
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The amount paid by Aetna for and on behalf of Merle 
Allred was not in dispute. 
Aetna's only role in the trial of this matter was in 
regards to Defendants' liability for the incident that 
caused Plaintiff's injury. 
Depositions of the following individuals were all 
necessarily and reasonably taken to properly defend 
this action: 
a) Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred; 
b) Defendant, Sean Anastasion; 
c) Defendant, Ann Anastasion; 
d) Becky Sue Neville; 
e) Dr. Robert Hansen; and 
f) Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen. 
Defendant Ann Anastasion necessarily and reasonably 
paid the statutory witness fee of Seventeen and No/100 
Dollars ($17.00) to the following individuals: 
a) Holy Cross Hospital; 
b) Dr. Robert P. Hansen; 
c) Defendant, Sean Anastasion; 
d) Ted Conger, D.C.; 
e) Dr. David E. Curtis; 
f) Bryan Drennan; and 
g) Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen. 
After a trial on the merits Defendant, Ann Anastasion, 
was the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d) Defendant Ann Anastasion, as the 
prevailing party, is entitled to recover those costs 
and fees she necessarily and reasonably incurred in 
defending this action. 
Defendant Ann Anastasion cannot recover the amount she 
unnecessarily paid to request a jury. 
Aetna and Plaintiff are jointly and severally liable 
for the costs incurred by Defendant Ann Anastasion 
which relate to liability for the accident which 
injured Plaintiff. 
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4. Plaintiff is solely liable for the costs and fees 
incurred by Defendant Ann Anastasion which related to 
the establishment or rebuttal of Plaintiff's claimed 
damages. 
ORDER 
After reviewing the memoranda submitted by all parties and 
the applicable law, being fully informed and for good cause 
shown the Court hereby Orders that: 
1. Both Aetna and Plaintiff are jointly and severally 
liable to Ann Anastasion, the prevailing party, for the 
following costs: 
a) court reporter fees for the depositions of 
Defendant Ann Anastasion, Defendant Sean 
Anastasion and Plaintiff, Merle L. Allred (first 
deposition only) in an amount of $ 288.10; and 
b) witness fees paid to Sean Anastasion and Bryan 
Drennan in an amount of $34.00. 
2. Plaintiff is solely liable to Ann Anastasion, the 
prevailing party, for the following costs: 
a) court reporter fees for the depositions of Merle 
L. Allred (2nd deposition only), Becky Sue 
Neville, Dr. Robert P. Hansen, and Dr. G. Lynn 
Rasmussen in the amount of $874.70; and 
b) witness fees paid to Holy Cross Hospital, Dr. 
Robert P. Hansen, Ted Conger, D.C., Dr. David E. 
Curtis, Bryan Drennan, and Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen 
in the amount of $119.00. 
3. Defendant Ann Anastasion can only collect a total of 
One Thousand Three Hundred Fifteen and 80/100 Dollars 
($1,315.80) of the costs necessarily incurred in 
successfully defending against Plaintiff's and Aetna's 
claims. Plaintiff Merle L. Allred, is solely liable 
for $993.70 of that amount and Defendant Ann Anastasion 
can collect the remaining $322.10 from either of the 
parties or a portion from each of them. 
4. Judgment shall be entered against Pacificorp Electric 
Operations and Aetna Health Plans in favor of Ann 
Anastasion in the amount of Three Hundred Twenty Two 
and 10/100 Dollars ($322.10). 
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5. Judgment shall be entered against Merle Lee Allred in 
favor of Ann Anastasion in the amount of One Thousand 
Three Hundred Fifteen and 80/100 Dollars ($1,315.80). 
[R. pp. 970-75]2. A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order regarding the award of costs is attached hereto as 
"Addendum "G" 
Aetna has appealed the trial court's decision to strike 
its purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff, 
the trial court's decision to set aside the judgment based upon 
that ineffective acceptance, and the trial court's award of some 
of the costs in this case to Ann Anastasion and against Aetna. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are included 
in the preceding section "Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
Below." Ann Anastasion does not believe there are any additional 
facts that have any bearing on the issues involved in this 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ann Anastasion made an Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff 
in order to end all litigation associated with Plaintiff's claim. 
2
 As of the date on which this Brief was prepared the Clerk 
of the Third District Court had not yet numbered the pages of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order regarding costs 
which was finally signed by Judge Hanson. Pages 970-75 represent 
the page numbers that would be affixed to the pages of the record 
if the unnumbered pages were consecutively numbered by the clerk 
from the last page of the transcript of oral argument until the 
last page in the file. 
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Aetna was not the recipient or offeree of that Offer of Judgment 
and had no right, power or authority to accept it. An essential 
element of a legally enforceable agreement is a meeting of the 
minds, or mutual assent by ALL parties. In this case there was 
no meeting of the minds. An offer was made to Plaintiff to end 
all litigation and Aetna attempted to distort that offer into a 
judgment against Ann Anastasion. Aetna was provided with a copy 
of the Offer of Judgment as required by Rule 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which states: "...every written notice, 
appearance, demand, offer of judgment...and similar paper shall 
be served upon each of the parties." (emphasis added) Rule 5 
Utah R. Civ. P. Ann Anastasion's compliance with Rule 5, 
however, should not be misconstrued to create an unintended 
obligation on Ann Anastasion. 
Because the Offer of Judgment was not made to Aetna, 
the Judgment entered pursuant to Aetna's purported acceptance of 
the Offer of Judgment was properly set aside. The nature of 
Plaintiff's claims, the facts of the case and the jury's verdict 
in this matter all support Judge Hanson's decision that due to 
the mistake, fairness, equity and justice required the Judgment 
to be set aside. 
Rule 54(d) Utah R. Civ. P. mandates that the prevailing 
party recover its costs in successfully defending a claim. In 
the instant case Ann Anastasion was the prevailing party. Judge 
Hanson's decision to award Ann Anastasion her costs is supported 
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by the facts and circumstances of this case as well as the 
applicable rules. His decision to make Aetna responsible for 
only those costs associated with disputing liability is well 
founded in reason, equity and the law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE ANN ANASTASION MADE AN OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO 
PLAINTIFF TO END ALL LITIGATION AND DID NOT MAKE ANY OFFER 
TO AETNA, AETNA DID NOT HAVE ANY RIGHT, POWER OR AUTHORITY 
TO ACCEPT THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT AND THEREFORE THERE WAS NO 
MEETING OF THE MINDS NECESSARY TO CREATE AN ENFORCEABLE 
AGREEMENT AND AETNA'S PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER OF 
JUDGMENT WAS VOID 
The trial court determined that Ann Anastasion made an 
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and that the Offer of Judgment was 
intended to end all litigation in this matter and was not made to 
or intended for Aetna. The court also found that, in light of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the Offer of Judgment, 
Aetna's claimed subjective belief that it could accept the Offer 
of Judgment was unreasonable. [R. pp.361-65], Since Aetna has 
failed to challenge those factual determinations they should form 
the basis for this Court's decision. 
Aetna contends that its receipt of Ann Anastasion's 
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff created, in it, a power of 
acceptance. That claimed power of acceptance is apparently based 
upon contract principles. Aetna, however, has failed to 
recognize that it only received a copy of Ann Anastasion's Offer 
of Judgment to Plaintiff because Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure requires that all offers of judgment be provided 
to all parties. Rule 5 Utah R. Civ. P. (1993). While the Offer 
of Judgment did not specify on its face that it was for 
Plaintiff's acceptance only, a multitude of facts in existence at 
the time the Offer of Judgment was filed evidence that the Offer 
of Judgment was intended for Plaintiff and not for Aetna. Those 
facts include: Aetna's admitted role in this litigation as 
nothing more than a subrogated party to Plaintiff's claim; the 
purposes of a Rule 68 Utah R. Civ. P. offer of judgment; the 
pending motion to have Aetna dismissed from the litigation; the 
fact that Aetna's total claim was significantly less than the 
Offer of Judgment; the hotly contested liability issues involved 
in this dispute; and prior attempts to negotiate a settlement of 
this dispute with a lump sum payment. 
A. A Meeting Of The Minds Is Necessary Before A Legally 
Binding Agreement Can Be Reached 
Aetna's arguments also ignore the well settled 
principle of contract law that an essential condition "precedent 
to the enforcement of any contract is that there be meeting of 
the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be 
enforced." Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 
1988); quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 
1961). "[T] here can be no contract without the mutual assent of 
the parties." John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 
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743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). "[M]utual assent requires 
assent by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that 
their minds meet as to all terms." Crimson v. Western Co. of 
North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1983); quoting Cessna 
Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). In order 
to determine whether there is mutual assent by the parties, the 
parties' intentions are controlling. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 
P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). See also Zions First Natl. Bank v. 
Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Utah 1977). Whether or not a party 
intended to enter into a contract is a question of fact to be 
decided by the trial court. O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290 
(Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court's ruling in O'Hara was based 
in part upon a quote from a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision 
which stated "[t]here is not a meeting of the minds where the 
parties do not intend to contract and the question of intent 
generally is one to be determined by the trier of fact." 
Household Utilities v. The Andreiss Co., 236 N.W.2d 663 (Wis. 
1976) . 
In the instant case the trial court determined that Ann 
Anastasion's Offer of Judgment was an attempt to settle this 
lawsuit and was not an invitation intended for Aetna's 
acceptance. Without the intent to enter into an agreement, there 
could be no mutual assent by Ann Anastasion and Aetna. 
Consequently, a meeting of the minds would have been impossible. 
Without a meeting of the minds there is no enforceable agreement 
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and Judge Hanson's decision to strike Aetna's purported 
acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff was 
proper and should be upheld. 
B. One Party7 s Expectation Or Belief Cannot Create A 
Meeting Of The Minds 
One party's unsubstantiated expectations cannot 
establish a meeting of the minds sufficient to create an 
enforceable contact. Seare v. University of Utah School of Med., 
248 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9-10 (Utah App. 1994). An honest 
difference of understanding is fatal to the creation of a 
contract. Ingram v. Forrer, 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977). In the 
instant case, Aetna's claimed belief that Ann Anastastion offered 
to permit it to take a judgment against her demonstrates the 
differing beliefs of the two involved parties. Such a difference 
of understanding is a barrier preventing the creation of an 
enforceable agreement. 
C. The Party Attempting To Enforce A Contract Has The 
Burden Of Proving The Existence Of A Contract 
The burden to prove the existence of a contract is on 
the party seeking to enforce it. Oberhanslv, 572 P.2d at 1386; 
citing B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972). 
See also Spanish Fork Packing Co. v. House of Fine Meats, 508 
P.2d 1186, 1187 (Utah 1973). Aetna has hinged its entire 
argument on its claimed subjective belief that Ann Anastasion's 
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff was intended for its acceptance. 
Aetna, however, has failed to produce any support for the 
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elements necessary to establish a meeting of the minds and the 
existence of an enforceable agreement. Judge Hanson, found 
Aetna's alleged belief to be unreasonable. Aetna's erroneous 
assumption should, therefore, make no difference in the outcome 
of this appeal, and Judge Hanson's decision to strike Aetna's 
purported acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to 
Plaintiff should be upheld. 
Judge Hanson's determination that Ann Anastasion's 
Offer of Judgment would have no force or effect on Aetna 
eliminates Aetna's argument that it was forced to accept the 
Offer of Judgment. Additionally, Aetna was specifically advised 
that the Offer of Judgment was not intended for its acceptance 
and would not impact Aetna. Aetna, however, disregarded that 
information and took additional steps to attempt to accept and 
enforce the Offer of Judgment. [R. pp.947-50]. Irregardless of 
the potential impact of the Offer of Judgment on Aetna, there was 
no meeting of the minds and, therefore, Ann Anastasion has no 
legal obligation to recognize Aetna's meaningless acceptance of 
her Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff. 
D. Rule 68 Utah R. Civ. P. Would Be Frustrated If Aetna's 
Acceptance Of Ann Anastasion's Offer Of Judgment To 
Plaintiff Is Recognized As Valid 
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is intended to 
facilitate the economic, reasonable and efficient resolution of 
claims. To force Ann Anastasion to be indebted to Aetna for the 
amount set forth in her Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and still 
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defend her claims against Aetna would frustrate rather than 
promote the purpose behind Rule 68. This is particularly true 
where the status of the party attempting to accept an offer of 
judgment is nothing more than a subrogated party. Aetna did not 
have any independent claim against Ann Anastasion. Its claim was 
based entirely and solely on Plaintiff's claim. It would be 
ludicrous to subject Ann Anastasion to a Judgment pursuant to 
Aetna's purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment and then 
subject Ann Anastasion to the rigors of jury trial. In order to 
promote the purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and to 
protect the interests of the parties to this lawsuit Judge 
Hanson's decision striking Aetna's purported acceptance of the 
Offer of Judgment should be upheld. 
II. BECAUSE AETNA'S PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE OF ANN ANASTASION'S 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF WAS MEANINGLESS, THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BASED UPON THAT PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE WAS PROPERLY 
SET ASIDE 
The trial court ordered that in the interests of 
justice the Judgment entered against Ann Anastasion be set aside 
due to mistake. [R. pp.950-51]. The facts and circumstances of 
this case and the law set forth above clearly supports that 
ruling. Aetna has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that 
Judge Hanson's decision was an abuse of discretion and the trial 
court's ruling setting aside the judgment should be upheld. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD ANN ANASTASION HER COSTS 
AGAINST AETNA IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND MANDATED BY RULE 
54(c) UTAH R. CIV. P. 
Ann Anastasion was forced into court against her will. 
She made reasonable efforts to resolve this dispute prior to the 
jury trial conducted in February of 1994. Nevertheless, due to 
the positions taken by Aetna and Plaintiff, this matter proceeded 
to trial. After the trial the jury found Ann Anastasion without 
fault for the incident at the heart of Aetna's and Plaintiff's 
claims. The Jury's verdict made Ann Anastasion the prevailing 
party to this lawsuit. 
Rule 54(d) Utah R. Civ. P. states that "... costs SHALL 
BE AWARDED AS OF COURSE to the prevailing party..." (emphasis 
added). The award of "costs is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion." Ong Intl. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 
447, 460 (Utah 1993) . After the presentation of evidence and a 
trial on the merits Ann Anastasion was the prevailing party and 
as such should be awarded the costs she incurred to successfully 
defend Plaintiff's and Aetna's claims against her. The rule 
followed in Utah is that the prevailing party is entitled to 
recover "those fees which are required to be paid to the court 
and to witnesses" Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 
1980) as well as the costs and expenses that are "necessary to 
the presentation and preparation of a case." Ames, 846 P.2d at 
475; citing Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. Taxable costs include 
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expenses for depositions "taken in good faith and, in light of 
the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development 
and presentation of the case." Id. 
Because Aetna's claimed damages were liquidated and the 
only contingency on its recovery was liability for Plaintiff's 
injury, the trial court ruled that Aetna would only be held 
responsible for the costs incurred to defend issues of liability. 
[R. pp. 970-75]3 The trial court found that the depositions of 
Plaintiff, Ann Anastasion and Sean Anastasion, as well as the 
witness fees paid to Sean Anastasion and Bryan Drennan, were 
necessarily and reasonably incurred to dispute liability. Those 
are the only costs that Aetna was ordered to pay. Plaintiff was 
burdened with all of the costs incurred to dispute her claims for 
damages. The trial court's ruling which requires Aetna to bear 
the costs incurred by Ann Anastasion in disputing liability for 
its claims is well within its discretion and should not be 
overturned on appeal. 
Aetna propounds conflicting arguments. In one section 
of its brief it argues that it accepted the Offer of Judgment 
because it did not want to be held liable for Ann Anastasion's 
costs. In another section of its brief it argues that it cannot 
and should not be held responsible for Ann Anastasion's costs. 
Aetna's reliance on Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847 
3
 See Footnote 2. 
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(Utah 1978), is misplaced. Suniland is factually and 
procedurally distinct from this case. In Suniland, the appellant 
was unable to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was an 
abuse of discretion. Furthermore, in Suniland, the plaintiff and 
not the defendant prevailed. In this case Aetna filed a 
Crossclaim against Ann Anastasion claiming that she was negligent 
and that her negligence had resulted in its having to pay a 
portion of Plaintiff's medical bills. Those claims were defeated 
at trial. Aetna collected nothing on its Crossclaim and the 
costs awarded by Judge Hanson were necessarily and reasonably 
incurred to defeat Aetna's contention of liability. 
Utah law permits the prevailing party to recover the 
costs incurred to litigate a lawsuit. The costs are to be 
recovered from the losing parties. In the instant case Defendant 
Ann Anastasion was the prevailing party and Aetna lost. The 
trial court's decision to award Ann Anastasion her costs was 
reasonable, supported by the rules and the law and does not 
amount to an abuse of its discretion. Judge Hanson's decision, 
therefore should also be upheld. 
IV, AETNA'S APPEAL WAS FRIVOLOUS OR FOR DELAY AND ANN ANASTASION 
SHOULD BE AWARDED DOUBLE HER COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEY 
FEES FOR RESPONDING TO AETNA'S BRIEF 
Rule 33 Utah R. App. P. permits this court to award 
double costs and attorney fees when an appeal "is not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
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argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law" or is 
"interposed for an improper purpose such as to harass, cause 
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that 
will benefit only the party filing the appeal..." Rule 33(a) and 
(b) Utah R. App. P. Aetna's conduct throughout this entire case 
manifests an abuse of the legal system. This appeal has no 
reasonable factual or legal basis and an award of sanctions and 
costs would be appropriate. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 3 06 (Utah 
App. 1987) . Ann Anastasion, therefore, requests that she be 
awarded double her costs and the reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in responding to Aetna's appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Offer of Judgment filed by Ann Anastasion was made to 
Plaintiff and not to Aetna. Aetna had no right or authority to 
accept it. Its purported acceptance was unreasonable under the 
facts and circumstances of this case and Aetna has failed to 
demonstrate that there was or ever could have been a meeting of 
the minds regarding the Offer of Judgment. Aetna's arguments to 
the contrary are without factual and legal support. Judge Hanson 
correctly vacated Aetna's purported acceptance of Ann 
Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and properly set 
aside the Judgment which was based upon that meaningless 
acceptance. Judge Hanson's award of costs against Aetna is 
supported by the facts of this case, the rules and was well 
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within the discretionary authority granted to trial courts. This 
appeal was taken without any substantial likelihood of success 
and Aetna and or its attorneys should be ordered to pay double 
Ann Anastasion's costs as well as the attorney fees incurred 
during this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/ day of December, 1994. 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
Attorneys for Ann Anastasion 
By: Steven B. Smith 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that on the / day of December, 
1994, I mailed two true and correct copies of Ann Anastasion's 
Brief, first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Blake Atkin 
Johnathan Hawkins 
ATKIN Sc LILJA 
50 South Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
and 
Kelly Sheffield 
1364 Emigration Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
S^ )^6JZcr-/ 
Steven B. Smith 
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ADDENDUM "A 
xo 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be 
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule 
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named 
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, 
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or posses-
sion of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be 
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made 
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the 
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by deliver-
ing a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no 
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a 
copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or 
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, 
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if 
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing. 
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be 
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney 
practicing in any of the courts of this state. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are un-
usually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own 
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and re-
plies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-
claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the 
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order 
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own 
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, re-
quests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on 
order of the court or for use in the proceeding. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers 
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with 
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be filed 
with him, in which event he shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith 
transmit them to the office of the clerk, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
1 / UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 5(d) is 
amended to give the trial court the option, ei-
ther on an ad hoc basis or by local rule, of or-
dering that discovery papers, depositions, writ-
ten interrogatories, document requests, re-
quests for admission, and answers and xe-
sponses need not be filed unless required for 
specific use in the case. The committee is of the 
view that a local rule of the district courts on 
the subject should be encouraged. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 5, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — How civil action com-
menced, U.R.C.P. 3(a). 
Service by mail, additional time after, 
U.R.CP. 6(e). 
Third-party practice, U.R.CP. 14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Filed depositions. 
Service upon attorney. 
—Presumption of authorization. 
When service required. 
—Default judgment. 
Appeal. 
Cited. 
Filed depositions. 
Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court 
are presumptively public under the Utah Pub-
lic and Private Writings Act (former § 78-26-1 
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be 
kept secret only on a showing of good cause. 
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P2d 
1095 (Utah 1990). 
Service upon attorney. 
—Presumption of authorization. 
Where defendant engaged attorney only to 
file motion but never so notified court or attor-
ney, appearance of attorney to file motion 
raised presumption that he represented defen-
dant in full action. Where defendant presented 
no clear and convincing evidence to refute pre-
sumption, notice given to attorney of date set 
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v. 
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966). 
When service required. 
—Default judgment. 
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defen-
dants of default judgment entered against 
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985 ad-
dition of reference to Rule 55). 
Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the de-
fault judgment to defendants did not invalidate 
the default judgment when defendants re-
ceived the notice of default in time to move to 
set aside the judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life 
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 
672 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h), time for appeal 
from default judgment in city court runs from 
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather 
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v. 
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 288 
P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d)). 
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 4 
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury 
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7 
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v. 
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores, 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes 
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
Service of process by mail in international 
civil action as permissible under Hague Con-
vention, 112 A.L.R. Fed. 241. 
Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=» 
90; Pleading «=» 331 to 338. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at 
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to 
352. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15; 
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413. 
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual 
place of abode," or similar terms referring to 
Rule 6- Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
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when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, 
only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be consid-
ered. 
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a master may submit a draft 
thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their sugges-
tions, 
(f) Objections to appointment of master. A party may object to the ap-
pointment of any person as a master on the same grounds as a party may 
challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action. 
Such objections must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same man-
ner as a motion. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Challenging of jurors 
Rule 53, F.R.C.P. for cause, U.R.C.P. 47(f). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Scope of appointment. 
A special master who was directed to review 
Report. requests for cost reimbursements exceeded the 
—Failure to object. scope of his appointment by investigating and 
Waiver. reporting on the issue of attorney's fees since 
Scope of appointment. the court had already ordered an award of at-
Status as judicial officer. torney's fees and the parties had no notice that 
the master was to review that award nor did 
Report. ft\e parties have an opportunity to participate 
F a i lu rp to ohiprL m t n e master's proceedings. Plumb v. State, 
J
 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
r" i_e * j i_- i.- i. * > Status as judicial officer. 
One who made no objection to masters re-
 A .ftl m a s t e r h a s t h e d u t i e s a n d o M i 
port as required by this rule could not question
 t i o n s o f a j u d i c i a l officer> a n d t h u s s h ( m l d n o t 
the report for the first time on appeal from dis- engage in unethical ex parte contacts with the 
trict court order adopting the master's find- judge overseeing the case on matters pertinent 
ings. Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367 (Utah to the substance of the referral. Plumb v. State, 
1980). 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d 
§§ 226, 228; 66 Am. Jur. 2d References §§ 1 et 1079. 
seq., 30 et seq. Referee's failure to file report within time 
C.J.S. — 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 515, 520, 521 specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
to 528, 532, 533, 535, 537, 539 et seq.; 76 C.J.S.
 as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
References §§ 7 et seq., 60 to 110, 122 et seq. w ^
 a r e "exceptional conditions" justifying 
A.L.R. — Bankruptcy, right of creditor who reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 
has not filed timely petition for review of ref- i A L R Fed 922 
eree's order to participate in appeal secured by
 R e y N u m b e r s < _ E i t ^ 3 9 3 to 3 9 5 4 0 1 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R3d 914
 4 Q 4 4 0 g R ^ ^ ^ 3 e t 3 5 to 7 7 9 9 
Power of successor or substituted master or ' n» > 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on e se^' 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, 
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
tion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 
40(b). 
Judges* retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
§ 49-6-301. 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, 
U.R.C.P. 62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8. 
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Absence of judge from courtroom during trial transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
 alone new trial granted on ground of inade-
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
 q u a c y 0f damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 375 
A.L.R.3d 126. Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
 d a m a g e s f o r personal injury to or death of sea-
mg motion for new trial in.civil case of motion
 m a n -n a c t i o n g u n d e r J o n e s A c t ( 4 6 u s c s 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
 A 0 CQQ, , . . c . , . 
A .1 ., c . ' , . , i. • 1 • Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in *K
 n„ A T r> o J r^i 
civil case where jury has been waived or not m ° d e r n c a s e s ' 9 6 A -L R - F e d- 5 4 L
 J 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching a S e s fo r personal injury or death in actions un-
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on d e r Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. §§ 5 1 e t se(l-) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 189. 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. Key Numbers. — New Trial &=> 13 et seq., 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. to set aside judgment, § 21-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Mistake or inadvertence. 
. .„ . _. „M —Mutual mistake. 
Any other reason justifying relief.
 — R e a l p a r t y i n interest. 
—Default judgment. Appeals. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. Clerical mistakes. 
—Incompetent counsel. —Computation of damages. 
—Lack of due process. —Correction after appeal. 
—Merits of case. —Date of judgment. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Order to make deposit. 
In a suit by an auto leasing agency against a 
bank for breach of a contract in which the lat-
ter had agreed to buy the rights to rentals on 
cars leased by the agency, the trial court's or-
der that all the funds in question be paid into 
court or, alternatively, placed in a bank ac-
count was improper under this rule, since there 
was no evidence that the leasing agency either 
possessed the funds or held them as trustee for 
the bank; even if the order had been proper, 
the trial court's dismissal of agency's com-
plaint for failure to comply with the order was 
improper unless it appeared the agency had 
the ability to comply but contumaciously re-
fused to do so. Globe Leasing Corp. v. Bank of 
Salt Lake, 547 P.2d 197 (Utah 1976). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Eminent domain: payment or deposit of 
award in court as affecting condemner's right 
to appeal, 40 A.L.R.3d 203. 
Key Numbers. — Deposits in Court «=» 1 et 
seq. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deposits in 
Court § 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Deposits in Court § 1 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Garnishment, funds deposited in 
court as subject of, 1 A.L.R.3d 936. 
Appealability of order directing payment of 
money into court, 15 A.L.R.3d 568. 
Rule 68. Offer of judgment. 
(a) Tender of money before suit. When in an action for the recovery of 
money only, the defendant alleges in his answer that before the commence-
ment of the action he tendered to the plaintiff the full amount to which the 
plaintiff was entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the plaintiff the 
amount so tendered, and the allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff cannot 
recover costs, but must pay costs to the defendant. 
(b) Offer before trial. At any time more than 10 days before the trial 
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party 
an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property 
or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days 
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the 
offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance 
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment shall be en-
tered. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof 
is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment 
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree 
must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an 
offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (a) is sim-
ilar to Rule 68, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Joint tort-feasors, 
settlement and release, §§ 78-27-40 to 
78-27-43. 
Payment of medical or similar expenses not 
admissible in evidence, U.R.E. 409. 
Release, settlement or statement by injured 
person, rescission or disavowal, §§ 78-27-32 to 
78-27-36. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Offer before trial. 
—Costs. 
Attorney fees. 
Bill of costs. 
—Evidence. 
Privilege. 
Tender of money before suit. 
—Mortgage foreclosure. 
—Quiet title. 
—Waiver of defects. 
Offer before trial. 
—Costs. 
Attorney fees. 
The costs provided for in this rule are limited 
to taxable costs only and do not include attor-
ney fees. Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 
(Utah 1978). 
Bill of costs. 
Where defendants at commencement of trial 
offered in writing to allow judgment for certain 
sum and accrued costs in full satisfaction of 
plaintiff's claims, plaintiff could file bill of 
costs. Smith v. Nelson, 23 Utah 512, 65 P. 485 
(1901). 
—Evidence. 
Privilege. 
Letter Written before suit offering to permit 
adverse party to take judgment for specific 
amount was privileged and could not be used 
as evidence. McKinney v. Carson, 35 Utah 180, 
99 P. 660 (1909). 
ADDENDUM "E 
Third Judicial District 
JOHN E. HANSEN, #4590 
STEVEN B. SMITH, #5797 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ann Anastasion 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERLE LEE ALLRED, : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
ANN ANASTASION and SHAWN : Civil No. 910906462PI 
ANASTASION, 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. : 
Defendant Ann Anastasion's Motions: for Relief from the 
Judgment rendered against her pursuant to her Offer of Judgment to 
Merle Allred; for costs, attorney fees and sanctions; and to 
dismiss PacifiCorp and Aetna from this lawsuit came regularly 
before the Court on the 27th day of August, 1993, at the hour of 
4:00 p.m. pursuant to notice. Steven B. Smith of Scalley & Reading 
appeared on behalf of Ann Anastasion and Blake Atkin appeared on 
behalf of PacifiCorp and Aetna. Memoranda having been submitted by 
the respective parties and the matter having been argued and 
C:\SBS\PLEA0IWG\AMASTAS.F0F 
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submitted to the Court and the Court having rendered its decision 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Ann Anastasion made an Offer of Judgment to Merle 
Lee Allred. 
2. That Offer of Judgment was never made nor extended 
to PacifiCorp and or Aetna for their acceptance. 
3. That Offer of Judgment was intended to end all 
litigation associated with Merle Allred's claim for personal 
injuries against Ann Anastasion. 
4. PacifiCorp and Aetna attempted to accept that Offer 
of Judgment and obtained a judgment against Ann Anastasion pursuant 
to that purported acceptance. 
5. PacifiCorp and Aetna's only interest in this lawsuit 
is a subrogation interest in Merle Allred's claim against Ann 
Anastasion for reimbursement of monies it paid out for and on 
behalf of Merle Allred. 
6. The amount set forth in Ann Anastasion's Offer of 
Judgment to Merle Allred ($17,500.00) was over $2,500.00 greater 
than the amount PacifiCorp and Aetna had paid for Merle Allred's 
medical bills. 
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7. Counsel for Ann Anastasion disputed PacifiCorp's and 
Aetna's right and capacity to accept the Offer of Judgment as soon 
as they learned PacifiCorp and Aetna had attempted to accept it. 
8. PacifiCorp's and Aetna's claimed subjective belief 
that the Offer of Judgment was made to them was not reasonable. 
9. PacifiCorp's and Aetna's failure to accept Ann 
Anastasion's Offer of Judgment would not have obliged PacifiCorp 
and Aetna to pay Ann Anastasion's costs in the event a verdict less 
favorable than the Offer of Judgment was obtained against Ann 
Anastasion. 
10. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint naming 
PacifiCorp and Aetna as Defendants in this lawsuit was properly 
filed with this Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. No power of acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of 
Judgment was ever created in PacifiCorp and or Aetna. 
2. At no time did either PacifiCorp or Aetna have the 
right# power or authority to accept Ann Anastasion's Offer of 
Judgment. 
3. The judgment obtained by PacifiCorp and Aetna is 
vacated and has no legal force or affect whatsoever. 
4. Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment will have no 
legal force or affect whatsoever. 
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5. Each party is to bear its own costs and attorney 
fees. 
6. Sanctions are not appropriate under the facts and 
circumstances upon which this Order is based. 
ORDER 
The judgment rendered for PacifiCorp and Aetna against 
Ann Anastasion on August 4, 1993, is hereby vacated and Ann 
Anastasion is relieved from any and all legal force and or affect 
that judgment may have had. Ann Anastasion's Motion for Costs, 
Attorney's Fee and Sanctions is hereby defied and each party is to 
bear its own costs. 
DATED this day of September, 1993. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
dTTl/Xl^ U 
I hereby certify that on theQ^ fl day of September, 1993, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Steven B. Smith, Esq. 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Kelly R. Sheffield, Esq. 
1364 Emigration Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Blake S. Atkin, Esq. 
350 South 400 East, #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sean Anastasion 
Defendant Pro Se 
364 East 600 South 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
ftn/ftwt 
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Ttwc 
hAK 
,j*stnct 
y V'-QU J OHN EDWARD H A N S E N , # 4 b i l l ) 
STEVEN B. SMITH, # » 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ann Anastasion > 
261 East 300 South, „ ^ i ^ - ~ J 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (° A1 ) r^ ! - 7 3'? 0 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIA. -STRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERI.F. LEF; ALL >, 
rlaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN ANASTASION • " SHAWN 
ANASTASION, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
Civil "-! :-90646£PI 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
"III""IIi ab'O"! re entitled matter came on regularly for trial the 
7th, 8th and 9th oJ Kebruar} I lie lionoiiih 
Hai ison presiding, the case being tried to a )in i( Plaintiff Merie 
Lei,"" i i ILL it, [il W A S represented l;> y K P M . f field PacIfiC^rr Electric 
Operations and Aetna Health Tin u i -pi esuin cil 
Bonner. Defendant Ann Anastas "i , "as represented by Steven 13. 
. ^ jojjn Edward Hanson of 9rallpy fy -««dir*- ^pfendant Sean 
^" was person.:. ."AMI I I HI ml t 
n t being taken a g a i n s t hi 1  1 1 I 11 I m>t p a r t i c i p a t e as a pa r ty 
mi 11 i .in '. in J V 
r l i ! i l 
After conclusion of the evidence, the case was submitted 
to the jury on special verdict interrogatories and the jury 
answered the following pertinent interrogatories: 
1 Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, Ann 
Anastasion was negligent? 
YES NO X 
2. Considering all of the negligence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, 
Sean Anastasion, was negligent? 
YES NO X 
Based on the jury's response to the above-referenced 
interrogatories, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is 
entered in favor of Defendant Ann Anastasion and against Plaintiff 
Merle Lee Allred of no cause of action. It is further ordered, 
adjudged and decreed that based upon the jury's verdict referred to 
above, Plaintiff Merle Allred's Complaint against Defendant Ann 
Anastasion is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Likewise, all 
cross-claims and counter-claims of PacifiCorp Electric Operations 
and Aetna Health Plans against Plaintiff Merle Lee Allred and 
Defendant Ann Anastasion are also hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
The default judgment taken by PacifiCorp Electric Operations and 
B:\ANASTAS.JJV 2 
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Aetna Heal th PJ ai is aga I nst Defendant Sean Anastasion is not 
affected by the jury's verdict or thi s or der Defendai i t Ai n i 
:.-;^*^s:i oi i ; s awarded costs as set forth in the Memorandum of Costs 
previously submitted 
DATED this /" ^ " ~* ^.-. 4. 
B V ^ C O U H T 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
rf 
I hereby certify that on the 'f '" "Jay I , 1^194, a 
I mie and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment On .Jury Verdict was 
mailed
 fn\ pa • I, 'oxiowing: 
Steven B. Smith, Esq. 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kelly R, Sheffield, 
13»'4 Emigration Street 
Salt T.aki- fity Utah 84108 
Blake S. Atkin, Esq. 
350 South 400 East, #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sean Anastasion 
364 East 600 SOL 
Salt Lake Cit] 
S? 
6 0€M.<*< ^ CI^^^1^ 
o 
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m EDWARD HANSEN, #4590 
""/FN B. SMITH, #5797 
•:Y & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ann Anastasion 
East 300 South, Suite 200 
-. Lake City, Utah 84112 
T-.-ephone: (801) 531 7R70 
' ' < ^ Judicial District 
C'-'J fc
 1994 
-vLty cr:^. 
I III "II"! I IK T i l I M i -1 U! l" L C I / X L . I ? 
STAZ 
T i "II1 I A I . T \ii\YR f i f iHTlTY 
H 
MER L,L:1 IL.KK ALl.iKhlL), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN ANASTASION, SEAN 
ANASTASION, PACIFICORP 
ELECTRIC OPERATIONS, AND 
AETNA HEALTH PLANS, 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER REGARDING 
THE AWARD OF COSTS TO THE 
PREVAILING PARTY 
is c 
Judge 1 ^.uot.zx K. Hanson 
Defendant Ann Anastasion's request for costs and 
d.-- x-.: ?•-'•-"-* ^f^r..1 -.rv ' ird-Party 
Plaintiffs Aetna ii^^^i - *..j .,aj.::^„ip d e c l i n e operations' 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Aetna and Plaintiff, 
M - '• "•- T *' '- A"1" ^ :' *h--c*-;-jns co Ann Ana~tac:^~' "' mcrandum ^i 
CosLo ana liiooursei;;ents nav^ng come regulai-> ot.:-:'- Cx.e .ourt, and 
the Court having reviewed the materials submitted,, hereby makes the 
following findings of fact, conclusions of law and enters the 
following Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff paid the statutory jury demand fee of 
$50.00. 
2. Subsequently and unnecessarily, Defendant Ann 
Anastasion also paid the statutory jury demand fee of $50.00. 
3. Aetna's only involvement in this litigation dealt 
with its subrogation rights as Plaintiff's health insurance carrier 
and, throughout this litigation and for all purposes, stood in the 
shoes of Plaintiff. 
4. The amount paid by Aetna for and on behalf of Merle 
Allred was not in dispute. 
5. Aetna's only role in the trial of this matter was in 
regards to Defendants' liability for the incident that caused 
Plaintiff s injury. 
6. Depositions of the following individuals were all 
necessarily and reasonably taken to properly defend this action: 
a) Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred; 
b) Defendant, Sean Anastasion; 
c) Defendant, Ann Anastasion; 
d) Becky Sue Neville; 
e) Dr. Robert Hansen; and 
f) Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen. 
2 
^efondan*" *nn Anastasion necessari "i v ~r,d r e a s o n a b l y 
p a i d the s:a' :/ .p. -11:..-^.. . - •-•. . - "0 I) :)1] ai: s 
($17.00) ~' • ;i-- following individuals: 
._ .. \ •• ross Hospital .-
l.*r. Robert •" ':~::sen: 
:: .• Defendant, Sea:. Anasr..i 3d 01 i; 
d; Ted Conger, D.C.; 
e- Zr. David E. Curtis; 
f Bryan Crennan; and 
-T T^ r n T ^ rn^ Rasmussen. 
8 . ? 1: :n = i n e :i : :i t s Defendai it. \ \i in 
Anastasion, was tn- prevailing party. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
niyr-ii^t- *-r\ D<i]a c::\ . -? • P e f e r d an t Ann Anastasion. as 
the _. . - • - , J -rs 
she necessarily a n , reasonably incurred m defending this action. 
•^f-ndan1- - ^ r ^ ' ^ ^ - ^ cannot recover the amount 
sLi ..IU.V . *. .-j.. p.-
-c.a ana P i a i n t i t i are -ointly and severally liable 
for * h^ ^ s t s incurred by Defendant Arm Anastasion which relate to 
] :i i il . .- .- • 
l; .a r.Liff :s solely liable nor uhe costs and fees 
incurred Defends- ?\nasf asi ':n -~:r„h ^elated to the 
eslafal i-o. . <- 1. i i • nages. 
3 
ORDER 
After reviewing the memoranda submitted by all parties 
and the applicable law, being fully informed and for good cause 
shown the Court hereby Orders that: 
1. Both Aetna and Plaintiff are jointly and severally 
liable to Ann Anastasion, the prevailing party, for the following 
costs: 
a) court reporter fees for the depositions of 
Defendant Ann Anastasion, Defendant Sean 
Anastasion and Plaintiff, Merle L. 
Allred(first deposition only) in an amount of 
$ 288.10; and 
b) witness fees paid to Sean Anastasion and Bryan 
Drennan in an amount of $34.00. 
2. Plaintiff is solely liable to Ann Anastasion, the 
prevailing party, for the following costs: 
a) court reporter fees for the depositions of 
Merle L. Allred(2nd deposition only), Becky 
Sue Neville, Dr. Robert P. Hansen, and Dr. G. 
Lynn Rasmussen in the amount of $874.70; and 
b) witness fees paid to Holy Cross Hospital, Dr. 
Robert P. Hansen, Ted Conger, D.C., Dr. David 
E. Curtis, Bryan Drennan, and Dr. G. Lynn 
Rasmussen in the amount of $119.00. 
3. Defendant Ann Anastasion can only collect a total of 
One Thousand Three Hundred Fifteen and 80/100 Dollars ($1,315.80) 
of the costs necessarily incurred in successfully defending against 
Plaintiff's and Aetna's claims. Plaintiff Merle L. Allred, is 
solely liable for $993.70 of that amount and Defendant Ann 
4 
Anastasion can collect the remaining $322.10 from either of the 
parties «o^  i "-crticn fro71! °ach f^ rheir 
-
i
- - .-. M: e :i agaii ist Paci ficoi: p 
Elect:::. - peiaM::. and Ae:,na Hea„::!; Pi ans in favor of .Ann 
Anastasion i r * ~- amount ^i Three Hundred Twenty Two and 10/100 
avc 
idgment shall be entered against Merle Lee Allred 
Ar ^ stasio* 
DATED this £iO day o' 
/Judge Timoth 
District Cou; 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 1994, 
that a true and correct copy of the forgoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed postage prepaid, addressed 
to the following: 
Kelly R. Sheffield, Esq. 
1364 Emigration Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Blake S. Atkin, Esq. 
50 South Main Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Steven B. Smith 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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